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Summary
It might seem strange to ask whether increasing access to medical care can improve children’s 
health. Yet Lindsey Leininger and Helen Levy begin by pointing out that access to care plays a 
smaller role than we might think, and that many other factors, such as those discussed else-
where in this issue, strongly influence children’s health. 
Nonetheless, they find that, on the whole, policies to improve access indeed improve children’s 
health, with the caveat that context plays a big role—medical care “matters more at some 
times, or for some children, than others.” Focusing on studies that can plausibly show a causal 
effect between policies to increase access and better health for children, and starting from an 
economic framework, they consider both the demand for and the supply of health care. On 
the demand side, they examine what happens when the government expands public insurance 
programs (such as Medicaid), or when parents are offered financial incentives to take their 
children to preventive appointments. On the supply side, they look at what happens when pub-
lic insurance programs increase the payments that they offer to health-care providers, or when 
health-care providers are placed directly in schools where children spend their days. They also 
examine how the Affordable Care Act is likely to affect children’s access to medical care. 
Leininger and Levy reach three main conclusions. First, despite tremendous progress in 
recent decades, not all children have insurance coverage, and immigrant children are espe-
cially vulnerable. Second, insurance coverage alone doesn’t guarantee access to care, and 
insured children may still face barriers to getting the care they need. Finally, as this issue of 
Future of Children demonstrates, access to care is only one of the factors that policy makers 
should consider as they seek to make the nation’s children healthier.
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W hat role does access to medical care play in protecting and promoting children’s health? Although it 
might seem self-evident that medical care 
improves children’s health, evidence for the 
population as a whole suggests that medical 
care is less important than we might have 
thought. One widely cited study estimates 
that lack of access to medical care explains 
only about 10 percent of early mortality in 
the population as a whole; the remainder 
is attributed to genetics (30 percent), social 
circumstances (15 percent), environmental 
exposure (5 percent), and behavioral fac-
tors (40 percent).1 Compared with its effect 
on overall mortality, medical care may be 
more or less important as a determinant of 
children’s health. Medical care’s role also 
depends on time, place, and context; for 
example, screening children for exposure to 
lead may be much more valuable in an envi-
ronment with older housing stock. Similarly, 
access to medical care is critically impor-
tant during infectious disease outbreaks. 
Nonetheless, the fact that, on average, 
medical care may matter less than we think 
is a useful starting point as we consider how 
access to care affects children’s health. 
In this article, we review what is known 
about how policies that promote access to 
medical care affect children’s health. We 
consider a range of such policies, including 
government-provided insurance coverage, 
increased payments to health-care providers 
who care for publicly insured children, cash 
payments to parents who take their children 
to get care, and the placement of health-care 
providers in schools. We organize our discus-
sion using an economic framework, catego-
rizing policies to promote access according 
to whether they affect primarily the demand 
side of the market (children and their 
families) or the supply side (doctors, hospi-
tals, clinics, and other providers of medical 
care). The aspect that we care about—actual 
use of services, or what sociologist Ronald 
Andersen calls “realized access”—is, of 
course, the result of the interaction between 
supply and demand.2 But policies to pro-
mote access tend to focus on one side of the 
market or the other, and so we structure our 
discussion accordingly.
Ultimately, we conclude that access to 
medical care does affect children’s health, 
and that an array of policies to improve 
access—expanding coverage, increasing 
reimbursement to providers, placing nurses 
or counselors in schools—can improve 
children’s health. We can’t say which of these 
policies yields the most bang for the buck 
in terms of improved health, nor can we say 
whether they are more effective than poli-
cies that focus on domains beyond access 
to medical care, such as those discussed 
in other articles in this issue. At the same 
time, we can say with some certainty that 
access to care is not the whole reason some 
kids are healthier than others, a point that 
is reinforced by the fact that socioeconomic 
disparities in child health exist in countries 
like Canada that have more equal access to 
health care.3 Nonmedical inputs into chil-
dren’s health, like those discussed elsewhere 
in this issue, as well as the quality of medical 
care, are important pieces of the puzzle. 
Finally, we close by discussing how the 
Affordable Care Act is likely to affect chil-
dren’s access to care, the policy questions 
that may arise as this landmark legislation 
is implemented against an already complex 
backdrop of public insurance programs for 
children, and the challenges that will remain 
to ensure children’s access to care.
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Standards for Inclusion 
in This Review
At the outset, we need to acknowledge that 
it’s hard to identify true causation when it 
comes to how access to medical care affects 
health. Simply comparing people with and 
without insurance, for example, or those 
who have public versus private coverage, 
tells us little about how insurance affects 
health.4 We can’t necessarily solve this 
problem by using statistical models that 
control for observed differences between 
the two groups; such an analysis might even 
yield the paradoxical result that Medicaid 
appears to make health worse, when in fact 
the worse health of Medicaid enrollees may 
be driven by other dimensions of disadvan-
tage that are not necessarily measured in 
the data.5 Evaluating the experience over 
time of new enrollees in public programs 
may also be misleading, since the decision 
to enroll in the program may have been 
driven by declining health—a phenomenon 
first identified in the context of job training 
programs, where those who enroll are more 
likely to have experienced a dip in earnings 
beforehand.6
With these considerations in mind, we focus 
on studies that have an effective strategy for 
dealing with such problems. In practice, this 
means we favor studies that rely either on 
randomized trials—relatively rare, but not 
unknown, in social policy—or on “natural 
experiment” methods that rely on changes 
in policy that are close to random (such as 
a federally imposed requirement that all 
states expand their Medicaid programs for 
children—more on this later) and there-
fore can teach us something about how 
the policy in question affects the outcomes 
we want to study. The trade-off associ-
ated with relying on randomized trials or 
natural experiments is that they give us 
good information about a relatively narrow 
range of situations. For example, most of our 
evidence on the impact of health insurance 
on children’s health relates to low-income 
children who are on the margin of Medicaid 
eligibility, with much less information 
about those who are privately insured, even 
though, judging by the 2012 American 
Community Survey, the privately insured 
represent 55 percent of all children.
In terms of what outcomes to look for, we 
focus on studies that measure either health 
or the use of preventive services; use of 
preventive services includes whether a child 
makes any visit to a doctor during the year, 
since the American Academy of Pediatrics 
recommends that all children have at least 
one visit per year, even if it is only a well-
child visit. We don’t consider studies that 
review only how policy affects, for example, 
the total amount of medical care that chil-
dren use (which would include sick visits and 
hospitalizations). Our rationale for singling 
out preventive services is that health benefits 
from prevention may occur far down the 
road; a necessary although not sufficient step 
for policy to improve health through pre-
venting illness would be to increase the use 
of preventive services. 
Finally, this article does not consider 
two special groups, not because they are 
unimportant but because they are dis-
cussed elsewhere. In this issue of Future 
of Children, Maya Rossin-Slater discusses 
how access to prenatal care affects infants’ 
health. And health insurance for children 
with disabilities—how it affects their 
access to care and their health outcomes—
was reviewed by Peter Szilagyi in a recent 
issue of the journal.7
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Demand-Side Policies
The primary demand-side policy to promote 
children’s access to medical care is provid-
ing free or subsidized health insurance. The 
past 25 years have seen dramatic expansions 
of Medicaid, as well as the creation of the 
State Children’s Health Insurance Program 
(formerly known as SCHIP and now as 
CHIP) in 1997. Table 1 describes selected 
milestones in the history of public health 
insurance coverage for U.S. children, and 
figure 1 shows how enrollment in these pro-
grams has grown. In 1988, approximately 
16 percent of all children were covered by 
Medicaid; in 2010, Medicaid and CHIP 
together covered half of all children under 
age 19 for at least some part of the year, as 
well as 45 percent of all births.8 This growth 
both increases the importance of public 
insurance as a way of promoting access to 
care and provides an opportunity to evalu-
ate how public coverage affects the health 
of infants and children. In this section, we 
review the evidence on the effects of these 
large expansions in public health insurance. 
In addition to considering the consequences 
of whether children have coverage at all, we 
consider the continuity, type, and generosity 
of coverage for those who have it. We exam-
ine how insurance “churning”—moving in 
and out of coverage—may affect children’s 
health, and we look at the relatively limited 
evidence on how HMO or high-deductible 
plans affect health compared with more 
traditional insurance coverage. Finally, 
we discuss two studies that evaluate what 
happens to children’s health when parents 
receive direct financial incentives to obtain 
preventive care for their children.
How Insurance Affects Child Health
With a few exceptions, most of the evidence 
on how health insurance—and the improve-
ment in access to care that it affords—affects 
children’s health and use of preventive 
services comes from expansions of Medicaid 
in the late 1980s and early 1990s and the 
establishment of SCHIP in 1997. One of the 
important exceptions is the RAND Health 
Insurance Experiment (HIE), conducted 
between 1971 and 1986.
The RAND Health Insurance 
Experiment
The RAND HIE has been extensively 
described elsewhere.9 In a nutshell, the 
Table 1. Milestones in Public Health Insurance Programs for Children
1965 Medicaid is established to provide health insurance coverage to children in families receiving 
welfare.
1986–90 Congress requires gradual increases in income eligibility threshold for Medicaid until all 
children living below the poverty level are covered by Medicaid.
1997 Congress enacts the State Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP), providing funds for 
states to expand insurance coverage to low-income children above the poverty level, either 
through their existing Medicaid programs or through new state-sponsored programs.
2009 Congress reauthorizes the State Children’s Health Insurance Program and changes its 
acronym from SCHIP to CHIP.
2010 Affordable Care Act (ACA) becomes law.
2014 Major coverage provisions of the ACA take effect: health insurance expansions, premium tax 
credits, individual coverage mandate, and Medicaid expansions for adults in some states.
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experimenters randomly assigned approxi-
mately 6,000 people to insurance plans 
with different levels of cost sharing. At one 
extreme was a plan in which all care was 
free; at the other, a plan in which partici-
pants had to pay 95 percent of the cost of 
their care, up to an out-of-pocket maximum 
of $1,000, at which point care was free. Note 
that because of inflation, $1,000 in 1971 
would be almost $6,000 in today’s dollars, so 
the RAND participants with the least gener-
ous coverage had what we now think of as a 
high-deductible health plan. After tracking 
the participants for three to five years, the 
researchers compared their health-care use 
and health status. The results for adults have 
been well publicized; on average, the RAND 
HIE found no difference in health among 
adults across the different insurance plans, 












Sources: MACPAC June 2014 Report to Congress (Medicaid enrollment 1975–2011); 1998 Green Book (Medicaid 
enrollment 1972–1975); Marilyn Ellwood, Angela Merrill, and Wendy Conroy, “SCHIP’s Steady Enrollment Growth 
Continues,” Mathematica Policy Research, Final Report to the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, May 2003 
(CHIP enrollment 1998–2001); Statistical Abstract of the United States for years 2004–11 (CHIP enrollment 2003–09); 
CHIPRA Annual Reports to Congress for 2010 and 2011 (CHIP enrollment 2010 and 2011); Economic Report of the 
President 2012 (estimates of the population ages 0 to 19, all years).
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Low-income adults who received free care 
experienced some measurable improve-
ments in health; in particular, the research-
ers found improvements in corrected vision 
and, for those who began the study with 
hypertension, significant reductions in blood 
pressure.11
The results of the RAND HIE for the 
approximately 1,000 children who completed 
the study are similar. There were no differ-
ences across insurance plans, on average, 
in physiologic measures of health such as 
anemia and hearing or vision problems, or 
in parental assessments of children’s overall 
health—again, despite large differences in 
the use of medical care.12 Among children, 
anemia (for low-income children) and dental 
care (for all children) seemed to be excep-
tions. Eight percent of low-income children 
in the free care group had anemia at the end 
of the study, compared with 22 percent in 
cost-sharing plans, although the relatively 
small number of low-income children in the 
study makes it hard to say with confidence 
that this difference did not occur by chance. 
For children between the ages of six and 17, 
although the overall rate of decayed, miss-
ing, and filled teeth did not vary by insurance 
plan, children on the free care plan were 
more likely than those in the cost-sharing 
plans to have filled teeth rather than decayed 
or missing ones (on average, a difference 
of about one tooth).13 Among children ages 
three to five, those in the free care plan were 
less likely than those in the cost-sharing plans 
to have decayed teeth. Both of these effects 
were largest for children in low-income fami-
lies; in fact, for preschoolers in high-income 
families, the number of decayed teeth did not 
vary significantly for those covered by cost-
sharing plans (0.44 teeth) versus the free plan 
(0.19 teeth).14
The chief criticisms of the RAND results 
related to the health of children center on 
the fact that there were relatively few low-
income children in the study—possibly too 
few to detect important effects of coverage 
on health; the fact that the study excluded 
infants; and the relatively high proportion 
of children who left during the course of 
the study.15 For our purposes, an additional 
consideration is that RAND didn’t com-
pare insured versus uninsured people but 
rather estimated the effect of the generos-
ity of coinsurance in an insured population. 
Notwithstanding these caveats, the RAND 
results for children—like those for adults—
suggest that in the population as a whole, the 
generosity of insurance coverage does not 
significantly determine overall health. For 
high-risk children, however, which in this 
case means low-income children, the RAND 
experiment suggests that the generosity of 
coverage does affect health (again, mirroring 
the results for adults).
Medicaid
Next, we consider how Medicaid affects chil-
dren’s health. Two recent studies analyzed 
Medicaid’s impact after its inception in 1965. 
Both found positive health effects. One 
study used variation across states in both 
the timing of Medicaid adoption and the 
fraction of children receiving welfare (who 
were automatically eligible for Medicaid) to 
identify how coverage affected infant and 
child mortality.16 It found that, in the year 
after implementation, mortality fell among 
nonwhite infants (although not among white 
infants), and that this effect persisted for at 
least 10 years. The second study exploited 
variation across states in the timing of 
Medicaid adoption to estimate how exposure 
to Medicaid in childhood affected health 
in adulthood.17 It found that among chil-
dren from low-income families, those who 
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experienced more years of Medicaid eligibil-
ity were in better health, measured using an 
index of chronic conditions, than were those 
with less exposure to Medicaid. This finding 
supports the rationale we offered above for 
focusing on the use of preventive services 
in addition to health outcomes; the effects 
of investments in health may take a while to 
reveal themselves. 
More recently, the expansions of Medicaid 
eligibility in the late 1980s and early 1990s 
have proved to be a powerful natural experi-
ment shedding light on how coverage affects 
infants’ and children’s health. Several influ-
ential studies have documented significant 
positive effects. One pair of researchers used 
mortality data, combined with a measure 
of the generosity of coverage expansions, 
and concluded that expanding eligibility 
significantly decreased child mortality.18 
Using a similar strategy, the same research-
ers focused on expansions of eligibility 
among pregnant women; they found that 
these expansions significantly increased 
women’s use of prenatal care and reduced 
the incidence of low birth weight and infant 
mortality.19 Another set of researchers used 
data from the National Hospital Discharge 
Survey to document that eligibility expan-
sions led to increased hospitalization among 
children. These researchers also looked at 
why the children were hospitalized, to see 
whether improved access to care might have 
succeeded in reducing hospitalizations for 
conditions like asthma that should ideally be 
managed with adequate primary care, while 
increasing hospitalizations for truly serious 
conditions. On the contrary, they found no 
decline in hospitalizations for conditions 
like asthma, suggesting, somewhat surpris-
ingly, that the expansion in coverage did not 
improve children’s access to primary care.20 
And a third set of researchers used data 
from the National Health Interview Survey 
to show that expansions of Medicaid eligibil-
ity increased use of preventive care. Though 
there was no immediate effect on children’s 
health, their health improved later in child-
hood, further bolstering the case for focus-
ing on use of preventive services.21
Exploiting the fact that an expansion of 
coverage meant that many more children 
born after September 30, 1983, were 
eligible for Medicaid than were children 
born before that date, another study 
measured how coverage affected adoles-
cents.22 It found significant reductions in 
mortality for black children ages 15 to 18 
but no reduction for whites (echoing the 
results for infants after Medicaid’s 1965 
inception). However, using the differences 
across states in the income level at which 
children are eligible for Medicaid, another 
study analyzed data from the Panel Study 
of Income Dynamics—Child Development 
Supplement, and found that Medicaid 
eligibility had no significant effect on three 
aspects of children’s health: the probability 
of being in excellent health, obesity, and 
school days missed because of illness.23
The Medicaid studies we’ve discussed so far 
focus primarily on the impact of expand-
ing eligibility, rather than on actual enroll-
ment. In contrast, one researcher exploited 
California’s variation in the placement of 
outreach centers for Medicaid enrollment 
to estimate the effect of actual enrollment 
on child health.24 She found that increases 
in enrollment led to significant decreases 
in hospital admissions for conditions that 
could, in theory, be well-managed in a pri-
mary care setting and should not result in 
hospitalization if children’s access to pri-
mary care is adequate.
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Taken as a whole, the evidence from studies 
of Medicaid expansion—and, in one case, 
actual enrollment—suggest that coverage has 
large and significant impacts on children’s 
physical health. To this firm conclusion, how-
ever, we would add several more nuanced 
observations. First, although the prepon-
derance of evidence supports the view that 
access is important for children’s health, not 
all studies find this to be so. This reinforces 
a point we made earlier: the importance of 
medical care depends on context. It matters 
more at some times, or for some children, 
than others. Access may matter more, for 
example, for the typical low-income child 
made newly eligible for Medicaid coverage 
than for the average child in the RAND 
experiment gaining access to more rather 
than less generous private coverage. Second, 
some programs—such as those that offer 
access to preventive services—may not yield 
any effect for months or even years, meaning 
that the available data, typically measured 
at one point in time, may understate their 
effects on children’s health in the long run. 
Third, researchers have paid relatively little 
attention to how coverage affects children’s 
mental health, even though some of cover-
age’s most striking effects on low-income 
adults are in the domain of mental health.25
How Continuity and Type of 
Coverage Affect Health
Insurance coverage among low-income chil-
dren is strikingly dynamic; such children 
frequently move between having public 
insurance, being uninsured, and having 
private insurance. For example, one nation-
ally representative study took a snapshot 
of child enrollees in Medicaid and tracked 
their enrollment one year later. Over one-
quarter had left the Medicaid program; 
among those who left, approximately half 
had become uninsured.26 State-specific 
studies have found similarly high Medicaid 
dropout rates and have also found that 
many dropouts reenter the program in 
fairly short order, a phenomenon known 
as “churn.”27 Unfortunately, this pattern 
is likely to continue in the post-ACA era; 
low-income families’ incomes and employ-
ment trajectories are quite volatile, and this 
volatility is projected to mean that chil-
dren’s eligibility for coverage will frequently 
churn between Medicaid, subsidized 
coverage from health insurance market-
places, and employer-based coverage.28 And 
although the ACA’s individual mandate now 
imposes a fine on families if their children 
are uninsured, a grace period allows a lapse 
in coverage of up to three months in any 
given year. Moreover, children in families 
under the tax filing threshold ($20,000 for 
a married couple in 2013) are not subject to 
the mandate and consequently could face 
longer coverage gaps.29
Insurance volatility is especially likely for 
children in families with income that is 
just above or below the Medicaid eligibil-
ity threshold. For families with income just 
below the threshold, an increase in income 
may mean that they have to begin mak-
ing a premium contribution even for public 
insurance; this has repeatedly been shown 
to increase the likelihood that they will lose 
coverage and experience uninsured spells.30 
Additionally, this group of children is the 
one most likely to experience across-year 
and even within-year shifts in eligibility for 
public coverage versus publicly subsidized 
exchange coverage.
Two studies use data that track children’s 
insurance coverage and health-care use 
over time to demonstrate compellingly that 
coverage gaps, even those of short duration, 
reduce children’s access to and use of care. 
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One of the authors of this article, Lindsey 
Leininger, examined how the number of 
months children spent uninsured affected 
the likelihood that they would experience 
any doctor’s visit and any well-child visit in a 
given year.31 She found that each additional 
month without coverage was associated with 
a small, statistically significant decline in the 
probability of both outcomes; four months 
without insurance—the typical length of an 
uninsured spell for this group—was associ-
ated with a 4 percent decrease in the likeli-
hood of any visit to a doctor and a 9 percent 
decrease in the likelihood of a well-child 
visit. The study found that one reason even 
short gaps in coverage reduced doctor visits 
is that interruptions in coverage may lead 
children to lose their usual source of care.
A recent study expanded on Leininger’s 
work, exploring how the types of coverage 
held over the course of a year (that is, public 
versus private), in addition to the duration 
of coverage, affected the likelihood of any 
visit to a doctor.32 Interestingly, it was not 
the type of coverage children held over the 
year—public, private, or a mix of public and 
private—that affected their use of health 
care, but solely the total amount of time 
for which the children had coverage. These 
findings offer some reassurance that children 
who churn among different types of insur-
ance coverage are likely to retain sufficient 
access to care, as long as the transitions are 
not punctuated by spells without insurance. 
Accordingly, we need policies that make such 
seamless transitions possible.
A related question is whether the struc-
ture of children’s insurance—whether 
they’re in fee-for-service or managed-care 
programs—affects their health. Several 
studies have examined whether Medicaid 
managed care for pregnant women affects 
their infants’ health, with varying results. 
One study used data on Medicaid benefi-
ciaries in California from 1993 to 1999 to 
evaluate the impact of that state’s switch 
to managed-care contracts for its Medicaid 
program.33 It found that this switch had 
no impact on infants’ health. Using a more 
reliable design, however, another study 
found that the switch to managed care in 
California led to increases in low birth 
weight, prematurity, and neonatal death; 
the authors noted that the managed-care 
plans they studied had no incentive to 
improve the health of newborns because 
expensive neonatal care was “carved out” 
of their contracts in the sense that expenses 
for those babies were reimbursed sepa-
rately, rather than being included in the 
lump-sum payments the plan received for 
providing routine newborn care.34 Earlier 
research on the transition to managed care 
in Tennessee’s Medicaid program between 
1993 and 1995 suggested that managed 
care led to lower Apgar scores and an 
increase in birth abnormalities, compared 
with births among Medicaid enrollees in 
a neighboring state (North Carolina) that 
did not transition to managed care for its 
Medicaid program.35 (The Apgar test, per-
formed minutes after birth, is a summary 
assessment of newborn health.)
Finally, there has been some concern that 
the cost-sharing in high-deductible health 
plans might discourage children’s use of 
preventive services. A recent study exam-
ined this question.36 Using data from a single 
health plan, the researchers analyzed the 
experience of 1,598 children whose parents’ 
employer switched their families from a 
standard insurance plan to a high-deductible 
plan. Although the fraction of these chil-
dren who received well-child visits over the 
course of a year decreased slightly (from 
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84.6 percent to 84.1 percent), this decrease 
was no larger than that of a control group of 
10,093 children who remained in traditional 
insurance plans throughout the study period 
(from 86.1 percent to 85.5 percent). For this 
population, at least, there is no evidence that 
the increase in cost-sharing associated with 
the switch to a high-deductible health plan 
reduced children’s use of preventive services. 
Because the switch to a high-deductible plan 
was made by the employer on behalf of all 
employees, the study avoided potential con-
cerns that families might have chosen a high-
deductible plan precisely because they don’t 
place much value on preventive services.
Financial Incentives for Use 
of Preventive Services
Medicaid agencies have recently begun 
adopting financial incentive programs to 
promote healthy behaviors and use of preven-
tive care among members.37 Most of these 
programs, including a series of demonstration 
projects created and funded as part of the 
ACA, focus on promoting healthy behav-
iors such as quitting smoking among adults, 
but a few have focused on well-child visits. 
Encouragingly, the results from the well-child 
visit pilot programs are the most positive 
among all of the burgeoning Medicaid incen-
tive programs. 
The best-studied program that focuses 
on children is Idaho’s Preventive Health 
Assistance (PHA). Launched in 2007, PHA 
aimed to increase compliance with recom-
mendations for well-child visits among chil-
dren in the state’s CHIP program. The effort 
was motivated by low compliance rates among 
the state’s Medicaid and CHIP child enroll-
ees, ranging from a high of 40 percent among 
children ages 0–6 to less than 19 percent for 
children ages 7–18.38 Though both Medicaid 
and CHIP had similarly low compliance rates, 
PHA was limited to CHIP enrollees, largely 
because of financial and administrative 
constraints in Medicaid.39 Under the PHA 
program, all CHIP enrollees were eligible to 
receive up to 10 points per month (equivalent 
to $10) to be used for the program premium’s 
payments, as long as the enrollee stayed up to 
date with the age-appropriate well-child visit 
schedule. This $10 credit was equal to the 
monthly premium required of CHIP enroll-
ees with family incomes between 139 percent 
and 149 percent of the federal poverty line, 
and it was two-thirds of the $15 monthly 
premium required of CHIP enrollees with 
family incomes between 150 percent and 185 
percent of the federal poverty line. 
Two studies found that PHA had large posi-
tive impacts on CHIP enrollees’ well-child 
visits. One study compared PHA participants 
to a control group of Medicaid-enrolled 
children. It found that after the PHA’s intro-
duction, well-child visits as much as doubled 
among some age and income subgroups of 
CHIP-enrolled children relative to their 
Medicaid-enrolled comparison groups. The 
largest increases occurred among older CHIP 
enrollees whose families had relatively higher 
incomes.40 Another study used the same 
design to explore how the PHA affected well-
child compliance rates across various sub-
groups.41 This study found that children who 
required only one well-child visit per year 
to meet compliance standards for their age 
experienced greater improvements from the 
program than did their peers who required 
two or more visits.
A financial incentive program launched by a 
Medicaid managed-care insurer in Minnesota 
has also been positively associated with well-
child visits. In October 2000, the insurer, 
Medica Health Plans, introduced a $10 
Target gift card as an incentive for member 
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children. The incentive was implemented via 
a voucher program—network physicians gave 
vouchers to parents during well-child visits 
that could be redeemed by mailing them 
back to the insurer. No control group was 
available, so a study of the program exploited 
differences in distance from the children’s 
homes to the nearest Target store to esti-
mate the program’s impact.42 The study 
found that children who lived within the 
sample’s median distance to a Target store 
(2.5 miles) saw a 6 percent relative increase 
in the likelihood of having a well-child visit, 
compared with children who lived further 
away (before the study began, 37 percent of 
children in the near-to-Target group were 
receiving well-child visits, compared with 28 
percent in the distant-from-Target group). 
Unfortunately, there is no easy way to use 
this “distance-to-Target” effect to estimate 
the incentive program’s actual impact, so it’s 
hard to compare these findings to those from 
Idaho. Importantly, however, the Idaho and 
Minnesota programs both showed positive 
impacts, albeit within opposite contexts: 
during the study period in Idaho, rates of 
well-child visits among Medicaid-enrolled 
comparison-group children were generally 
rising, while during the Minnesota study 
they were falling. 
We must also note a counterexample to these 
positive findings. A randomized controlled 
trial evaluating New York City’s conditional 
cash transfer program (Opportunity NYC) 
found no meaningful differences between 
treatment and comparison group children 
in the likelihood of having a well-child visit, 
which is perhaps surprising given that the 
program offered a relatively rich finan-
cial incentive of $200 per child per year.43 
The reason is likely that before the study 
began, rates of well-child visits among the 
participants were atypically high. Even the 
comparison group children (that is, those 
who weren’t offered an incentive), in every 
age group, had well-child visit rates in the 
mid-90-percent range. More promisingly, the 
study found than an incentive for dental vis-
its of $100 per child per visit (with a one-visit 
annual maximum for ages one to five and a 
two-visit annual maximum for ages six and 
above) had large impacts on whether middle 
and high school children received dental 
care. Two years after the randomized trial 
began, treatment-group high school students 
were more likely than comparison-group 
high school students to have had at least 
two dental visits in the prior year, by 13 per-
centage points (70 percent for treatment 
group, 57 percent for comparison group); 
treatment-group middle school students 
were more likely to have had two dental 
visits by 10 percentage points (70 percent for 
treatment group; 60 percent for comparison 
group). Importantly, these effects persisted 
(and indeed increased somewhat) at another 
follow-up two years later.44
The four studies we’ve just discussed con-
sistently demonstrated that financial incen-
tive programs can appreciably increase use 
of preventive care, including dental care, 
among low-income children. This finding 
mirrors similar work on adults, which has 
found that financial incentives are more 
effective when they target use of preventive 
care than when they aim to bring about more 
sustained health behavior changes, such as 
quitting smoking and exercising.45
The programs’ effectiveness was also greatly 
influenced by administrative difficulties 
associated with the system for redeeming 
the rewards; the success of Idaho’s PHA has 
been attributed to the fact that it automati-
cally credited earned rewards to families’ 
premiums.46 In contrast, the complex 
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Opportunity NYC reward system, which 
initially involved 22 categories of rewards, 
has been cited as a serious deterrent to the 
program’s effectiveness.47 Encouragingly, 
two recently implemented replications of 
the Opportunity NYC model have adopted 
considerably simpler financial reward 
systems.48
Supply-Side Policies
Turning now to the supply side, we review 
what is known about how provider reim-
bursement from Medicaid affects children’s 
health, since low payments to providers are 
one of the reasons that some providers simply 
do not see Medicaid patients. We also review 
evidence on policies that focus on providing 
care directly, including Federally Qualified 
Health Centers, the Vaccines for Children 
program, and school-based health centers. 
These policies have received less research 
attention than has public insurance, but they 
could nonetheless be important for improv-
ing children’s health.
How Medicaid Reimbursement Rates 
Affect Child Health
Compared to Medicare or private insurers, 
Medicaid has historically paid lower rates to 
doctors and other clinicians. A recent sur-
vey found that on average, Medicaid pays 
physicians approximately two-thirds of what 
Medicare would pay them, with consider-
able variation across states, from a low of 
37 percent in Rhode Island to a high of 134 
percent in North Dakota.49 Researchers and 
policy analysts have long been concerned 
that low Medicaid reimbursement rates may 
translate into diminished access to care for 
Medicaid patients.50 Three studies have 
examined the effects of Medicaid reim-
bursement levels on child-specific health 
outcomes; all of them found that higher 
reimbursement levels mean better health.
An important early study, now somewhat 
dated, assessed the relationship between 
Medicaid’s physician fees and infant 
health.51 This study examined changes in 
individual states’ fee levels over time to 
assess how the ratio of Medicaid fees to pri-
vate fees for obstetricians and gynecologists 
affected infant mortality rates. Its findings 
indicate that when the Medicaid-to-private 
fee ratio doubled (the ratio ranged from 0.45 
to 0.60 over the study period, according 
to the working paper version of the manu-
script), infant mortality fell by 0.56 deaths 
per 1,000 live births (mean infant mortal-
ity rate in the study was 9 deaths per 1,000 
births). Weighing the costs of increased 
reimbursement rates against the benefit of 
better health, the authors concluded that 
it cost about $260,000 (in 1986 dollars, or 
about $560,000 in 2014 dollars) in increased 
Medicaid fees to save one additional infant’s 
life. An important limitation of this study 
is that, unlike the others we review in this 
article, it analyzed state-level aggregate data 
as opposed to using person-level observa-
tions. Accordingly, we can’t know for which 
groups of women the changes in Medicaid 
fee ratios affected infant mortality. 
Two recent national studies convincingly 
demonstrate that Medicaid fee levels for 
dental services are positively related to the 
likelihood that publicly insured children 
receive dental care.52 Using changes in 
states’ Medicaid fees from 2000 to 2009 for 
a preventive dental visit for children, and 
employing a comparison group of privately 
insured children, one study found that 
increasing payments to providers from $20 
to $30 increased publicly insured children’s 
use of dental services enough to close the gap 
between them and their privately insured 
peers.53 The original payment level of $20 
was relatively stingy—less than the fees paid 
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to dentists for comparable work in 75 percent 
of cases—while the increased payment of 
$30 was relatively generous, less than only 
about 25 percent of such fees. To help put 
these findings in context, the most recent 
round of the National Survey on Children’s 
Health (2011–12) found that approximately 
74 percent of publicly insured children ages 
1–17 had received a dental visit in the previ-
ous year, compared with 83 percent of pri-
vately insured children. These findings are in 
keeping with an earlier, well-designed study 
that exploited a series of dental fee increases 
in the Michigan Medicaid program.54
Recent research documents 
that elementary school 
counselors can have beneficial 
behavioral effects on children.
Using the same research design, but with 
data covering a longer study period and a 
larger set of dental procedures, a later study 
produced very similar results, though the 
effects were somewhat smaller.55 However, 
this study used an additional calculation to 
show that the improvements in the public-
private gap in dental-care use came at 
great cost, because the large fee changes 
required to induce marginal improvements 
in dental-care use among publicly insured 
children would be applied toward all visits 
the children made, not just those induced by 
the changing fee schedule. Thus, they calcu-
lated, the implied cost of one additional visit 
was approximately eight times the amount 
of the current Medicaid payment rate for a 
single visit.
Taken together, these compelling studies 
suggest that for prenatal care and children’s 
dental care, increasing Medicaid provider 
fees is an important way to improve access. 
Unfortunately, to our knowledge, no studies 
of how Medicaid reimbursement levels affect 
children’s access to medical care or behavioral 
health care have research designs that meet 
our criteria for inclusion in this article.
How Policies that Provide Direct 
Medical Care Affect Child Health
In recent decades, promoting access to 
insurance coverage has been the primary 
policy to improve children’s access to medi-
cal care. But policies that provide medical 
care directly have also improved children’s 
health. These policies include placing 
counselors or health-care workers in schools, 
funding community health centers, and sub-
sidizing vaccinations.
Elementary School Counselors
Recent research documents that elementary 
school counselors can have beneficial 
behavioral effects on children. In contrast 
to counselors serving older children, 
who require intensive academic advising, 
elementary school counselors—there 
are more than 40,000 of them across the 
country—spend most of their time focusing 
on students’ mental and behavioral health.56
One study examined the effect of counselors 
by exploiting the differences within 
academic years in a Florida school district’s 
student-to-counselor ratios that arose 
from the placement schedule of University 
of Florida graduate student counseling 
interns.57 The researchers found that 
fewer students per counselor meant fewer 
discipline problems in schools. A decrease 
in the student-to-counselor ratio from the 
sample mean level of 544 students per 
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counselor to the ratio of 250 students per 
counselor recommended by the American 
School Counselor Association (ASCA) was 
associated with a 7.4 percent decrease in 
the probability that a given student would 
repeat a disciplinary problem. These effects 
were the most pronounced for black male 
students, who saw a 10 percent decrease. 
A school-level analysis suggests that a drop 
from the mean student-counselor ratio to the 
ASCA-recommended ratio is associated with 
an 11.8 percent decrease in the mean share 
of students with a disciplinary occurrence. 
A potential problem with the study design 
is that interns were more likely to be placed 
in schools with lower levels of discipline 
problems in the previous semester; to the 
extent that this occurred, however, it means 
that the study’s findings are conservative and 
may underestimate the true effect. 
Similar findings emerge from two com-
panion studies. The first exploited the fact 
that Alabama has strict enrollment cutoffs 
for financing elementary school counsel-
ors, meaning that schools with almost the 
same number of students could have differ-
ent numbers of counselors.58 Importantly, 
there is no evidence—either in the data, 
or based on conversations with Alabama 
school officials—that schools were strategi-
cally manipulating their enrollment levels 
to get more resources the following school 
year, which could have biased the find-
ings. The findings suggest that although the 
student-to-counselor ratio had no mean-
ingful relationship to academic outcomes 
(measured by math, reading, and language 
test scores), it did have a statistically signifi-
cant and qualitatively important influence 
on rates of suspension and weapons-related 
incidents. The estimated effect of having 
more counselors was somewhat sensitive to 
the assumptions used in different statistical 
analyses; the study’s best estimates indicated 
that an increase of one half-time counselor 
decreased the likelihood that the school 
would have at least one student suspension 
per school year by 20 percent compared to 
the mean rate of suspension and decreased 
the likelihood of at least one student 
weapons-related incident per school year by 
26 percent. However, the study found that 
additional counselors had no effect on other 
behaviors, including rates of attendance, 
expulsions, and drug-related incidents. 
In a later study, the same author explored 
how changes in state-level elementary 
school counselor policies affected a variety 
of teacher-reported measures of behavioral 
issues.59 The research design took advantage 
of the fact that different states adopted mini-
mum student-counselor ratios and/or subsi-
dies for schools to hire more counselors at 
different times. The study consistently found 
that additional counselors were associated 
with decreases in the likelihood that teach-
ers would report that a series of seven out of 
eight behavioral issues presented at least a 
minor problem. The decrease in likelihood 
typically ranged from 5 to 9 percent, with 
one outlier of 19 percent for the measure 
“students cutting class.” Interestingly, effects 
on the likelihood that teachers would report 
a given behavioral issue as a moderate or 
severe problem were much weaker—only two 
measures, “student drug abuse” and “physical 
conflicts among the students,” consistently 
showed significant effects.
Taken as a whole, these studies offer powerful 
evidence that public policies to reduce student-
to-counselor ratios have meaningful effects on 
elementary school students’ behavioral health. 
Such policies seem even more important 
when considered in the context of the high 
prevalence of mental and behavioral health 
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problems among children and the damage that 
they inflict, which Alison Cuellar discusses in 
detail in this issue.
School-Based Health Centers
A national network of approximately 2,000 
school-based health centers (SBHCs)—dis-
tributed across elementary, middle, and high 
schools—provides preventive services to an 
estimated 2 million children and adolescents 
each year.60 Though the SBHCs date back 
to the 1930s, the vast majority of existing 
centers (over 85 percent) were established 
after 1990, and 20 percent were established 
after 1999.61 The SBHCs serve a strikingly 
diverse student population; the racial/ethnic 
profile of host schools is fairly evenly divided 
among non-Hispanic white, Hispanic/Latino, 
and black students.62 The SBHCs are more 
prevalent in underserved communities, and 
over two-thirds of them explicitly seek to 
serve the broader community in addition 
to the host schools’ student population.63 
Under the Affordable Care Act, the SBHCs 
recently entered a period of great expansion. 
Specifically, the ACA appropriated $200 mil-
lion over the years 2010–13 both to increase 
the number of SBHCs and to increase ser-
vice levels at the existing SBHCs.64
A recent working paper constitutes the 
first empirical study of the SBHCs with 
a research design that can plausibly show 
causation.65 Based on the variation arising 
from openings, closings, and changes in 
per-student service levels in different 
counties over time, the authors estimated 
how the SBHCs affected teenage birthrates 
and high school dropout rates. Though 
they found no effect on dropout rates, they 
discovered large, statistically significant 
effects on teen birthrates. Specifically, they 
found that opening an average-size SBHC 
was associated with a 20 percent decline 
in the birthrate among teens less than 
15 years old (from an average of 0.56 births 
per 1,000 teens) and a 7 percent decline in 
the birthrate among teens ages 16–19 (from 
an average of 45.6 births per 1,000 teens). 
Moreover, they found that these results 
were driven entirely by the 85 percent 
of the SBHCs that offered birth control 
services (either directly or through referral), 
underscoring the SBHCs’ important role 
in providing access to reproductive health 
services, an issue around which there has 
been considerable controversy.66
Other Direct Provision Policies
The Affordable Care Act has appropri-
ated over $10 billion to expand Federally 
Qualified Health Centers (FQHCs), also 
commonly referred to as community health 
centers, a network of 9,000 clinics that 
provide primary care to underserved popu-
lations, including an estimated 7 million 
low-income children each year.67 A 2010 
study found that increases in federal fund-
ing for the FQHCs directly translate into 
meaningful increases in the services offered 
by the clinics—including, importantly, 
increases in behavioral health services. 
Thus the new ACA funding should increase 
access to preventive and mental health 
services among low-income children.68 
Although extensive correlational evidence 
suggests that the FQHCs achieve impres-
sive health benefits, no research that focuses 
specifically on the FQHCs and children’s 
health meets our criteria for inclusion in 
this review.69 A study of the early years of 
the FQHCs, beginning in the mid-1960s, 
found that the clinics were associated with 
declines in mortality among older adults, 
but no data suitable for analyzing outcomes 
among children were available.70
Another major policy to directly provide 
health care is Vaccines for Children (VFC), 
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the federal program that offers free vac-
cines to participating pediatricians’ offices 
for uninsured and publicly insured children. 
VFC pays for almost half of pediatric vac-
cines administered in the United States.71 
As with the FQHCs, the research evidence 
behind VFC is mostly correlational. Studies 
suggest that VFC’s introduction was associ-
ated with increases in immunization rates 
and, among inner-city children, decreases 
in fragmentation of care. However, these 
findings should not be taken as conclusive, 
because these studies were not designed in a 
way that can show causation.72
The ACA and Children’s Access 
to Medical Care
The passage and implementation of the 
Affordable Care Act (ACA) mark a new 
era for the health-care system. The law’s 
hallmark provisions provide new pathways 
to insurance coverage for populations that 
have historically been at high risk of being 
uninsured. These provisions were crafted 
largely with adults in mind because, before 
the ACA, children were much more likely 
than adults to be eligible for public coverage 
and less likely to be uninsured. Nonetheless, 
some of the coverage provisions targeting 
adults or low-income families will have spill-
over effects on children’s coverage and access 
to care. Moreover, some provisions of the 
ACA do focus on children or young adults. In 
this section, we outline how the ACA is likely 
to affect children’s access to care.
Coverage Impacts
The primary way that the ACA can influ-
ence children’s access to care is through 
increased insurance coverage. Overall, the 
ACA is projected to cut the fraction of unin-
sured children nearly in half, from 9.4 per-
cent to 5.3 percent.73 These gains will come 
from both private and public coverage. In 
terms of private insurance, one of the first 
ACA provisions to be implemented required 
private plans offering family coverage to 
allow children to remain on a parent’s 
policy until the age of 26, which produced 
an immediate and sizeable increase in 
insurance coverage among young adults.74 
Subsidized exchange coverage for children 
ineligible for public coverage whose parents 
also lack access to affordable employer-
sponsored coverage, as well as a mandate 
that almost all children be covered, are 
projected to bring insurance to 2 million 
children.75
Increased enrollment in public insur-
ance programs will drive many additional 
gains. An estimated 68 percent of unin-
sured children are currently eligible for 
Medicaid and CHIP, and though the ACA 
left children’s income eligibility for these 
programs broadly unchanged, several other 
forces are likely to increase this group’s 
take-up of public coverage.76 First, earlier 
experiences with public insurance expan-
sions have consistently demonstrated what 
is often called the “welcome mat” effect—a 
phenomenon in which expansion affects 
previously eligible but unenrolled popula-
tions.77 The ACA is likely to exert an appre-
ciable welcome mat effect on children; the 
reform effort has been highly visible, and 
a variety of stakeholders have spent con-
siderable resources on outreach, launch-
ing nationwide advertising campaigns and 
funding outreach workers who help facili-
tate enrollment. Moreover, parents’ eligibil-
ity for Medicaid has increased greatly in 
many of the states that have implemented 
the optional adult expansion, and research 
compellingly indicates that children’s 
Medicaid take-up increases when their par-
ents become eligible for Medicaid.78 Also, 
former foster-care children of all income 
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Box 1. Major Affordable Care Act Provisions Affecting Insurance Coverage  
of Children and Young Adults
Ban on excluding people for preexisting condition
Individuals (including children) cannot be denied coverage based on the presence of preexisting 
conditions (all large group and most individual/small group private plans*).
Premium determination
Most individual/small group plans cannot charge higher premiums based on health status or 
gender.
Ban on lifetime or annual coverage limits
No lifetime dollar limits are allowed on most covered benets (all private plans); no annual limits are 
allowed on most covered benets (all large group and most individual/small group private plans).
Maximum out-of-pocket responsibility
The law caps cost-sharing by most large group and individual/small group private plans. In 2014, 
this cap was $12,700 for families. 
Dependent coverage up to age 26
All private plans that cover children as dependents must make coverage available up to age 26.
Exchanges and subsidies
Health insurance marketplaces (“exchanges”) offer individual/small group private coverage. 
Families with incomes up through 400 percent of the federal poverty level who lack access to 
affordable employer coverage and are ineligible for Medicaid/CHIP are eligible for sliding-scale 
subsidies for exchange coverage.
Preventive services mandate
Most large groups and most individual/small group plans must cover a wide range of preventive 
services with no cost to the patient at the time of service.
Essential health benefits mandate
All exchange and most individual/small group plans must cover a wide range of preventive, acute, 
and rehabilitative services, including pediatric dental and vision services.
Medicaid expansion for parents
The law expands Medicaid eligibility to 138 percent of the federal poverty level for parents (state 
option). Large “welcome mat” effects are expected to increase the take-up of Medicaid coverage for 
eligible children who were previously unenrolled.
Medicaid expansion for young adults who have aged out of foster care
Young adults ages 19 and up who have aged out of foster care and who received Medicaid while in 
foster care remain eligible until they turn 26.
Individual mandate
All individuals in families with incomes over the tax ling threshold ($13,050 for a single parent 
with children in the household; $20,300 for married parents) must have health insurance; failure 
to meet this requirement results in a nancial penalty (with limited exemptions including nancial 
hardship or religious objections).
* In some cases, large groups may adopt a temporary preexisting condition exclusion period.
Definitions: A large group is a group health plan that covers employers/organizations with 100 or more employees/mem-
bers; in some contexts, a threshold of 50 or more employees/members is applied. A small group is a group health plan that 
covers employers/organizations that fall below the large group threshold. Individual insurance policies cover individuals 
and/or families as opposed to groups. 
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levels will be eligible for Medicaid until the 
age of 26, mirroring the policy change in 
the private market.
These changes to coverage shift the policy 
debate regarding reauthorization of funds 
for CHIP. The program’s current funding is 
slated to end this year. CHIP programs vary 
a great deal across states; however, there is 
bipartisan consensus that, on the whole, they 
have successfully lowered the uninsured 
rate among children.79 One principal factor 
has been the direct enrollment of millions 
of near-poor children into CHIP, which was 
serving 8 million children at the most recent 
count. Arguably, however, CHIP’s spillover 
effect on the much-larger Medicaid pro-
gram, which serves approximately 40 million 
children, has been even more important.80 
CHIP is notable for successful outreach 
and administrative simplification, which 
produced a very large welcome mat effect 
among Medicaid-eligible children. 
Under the ACA, the typical income range 
for CHIP eligibility—from 150 percent to 
250 percent of the federal poverty line—
now overlaps with the income eligibility 
levels for coverage through subsidized 
exchanges. Many current CHIP enrollees 
will be ineligible for this subsidized cover-
age, however, since their parents have offers 
of coverage under their employer-sponsored 
plans. Dependent coverage is typically very 
expensive, and its cost isn’t considered when 
determining eligibility for exchange subsi-
dies (a feature called the “family glitch”); 
thus many children covered by CHIP might 
become uninsured if the program is dis-
continued, unless the regulations governing 
eligibility for exchange subsidies are revised 
to fix the “family glitch.” With this in mind, 
the Medicaid and CHIP Payment and Access 
Commission (MACPAC), an independent 
agency that advises Congress, has recom-
mended funding CHIP for an additional two 
years, until adequate provisions for covering 
these children can be made. MACPAC is 
also concerned about potential differences in 
the generosity of children’s benefits between 
exchange coverage and CHIP. Its preliminary 
analysis suggests that, on average, CHIP 
plans have more generous coverage than 
exchange plans; MACPAC was to continue 
to monitor the issue and report back to 
Congress in spring 2015. 
The ACA also offers states the option of 
establishing and administering a Basic 
Health Program (BHP), which would 
mitigate the problem of differential benefit 
generosity. BHPs are intended to provide 
a subsidized coverage option, with benefits 
and provider networks similar to Medicaid’s, 
to Medicaid-ineligible people with incomes 
up to 200 percent of the federal poverty 
line.81 Such a program could reduce the 
potentially damaging effects of coverage 
churn among such people. Moreover, it 
would provide an option for low-income par-
ents who are eligible for neither Medicaid 
nor CHIP to have an insurance plan with 
the same provider networks as those avail-
able to their Medicaid- or CHIP-enrolled 
children. Though states have the option to 
establish a BHP beginning in 2015, as of 
this writing, very few states have signaled an 
interest in doing so.
Because it mandates increases in the scope 
or generosity of private coverage, the ACA 
may also improve access for children who 
are already insured. For example, the ACA 
prohibits annual or lifetime limits on cover-
age, and people can’t be denied coverage 
because of preexisting conditions. The act 
also requires that all private insurance, 
including employer-sponsored plans, cover 
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the full cost of preventive services, such as 
childhood immunizations and well-child 
visits. The ACA may also increase the scope 
of coverage for private individual health 
insurance plans by introducing minimum 
benefit standards called Essential Health 
Benefits. These standards encompass a wide 
range of preventive, acute, and rehabilitative 
services and, for children, vision and dental 
services. It is unclear how many children will 
be affected by these provisions, since many 
plans are likely to have covered most of these 
benefits already. 
The ACA also includes some smaller-scale 
supply-side provisions that are likely to 
affect children’s access to care, although 
exactly how is hard to predict. These provi-
sions include the expansion of funding for 
the SBHCs and the FQHCs, both of which 
are important sources of medical care for 
vulnerable children, as well as a tempo-
rary Medicaid reimbursement increase 
(in 2013–14) for primary care providers, 
including pediatricians, to achieve parity 
with Medicare. Additionally, several small-
scale workforce initiatives are designed to 
increase the supply of providers serving vul-
nerable populations, including underserved 
children. These expansions in supply may 
not be enough to meet projected demand 
increases likely to be induced by the ACA’s 
coverage provisions. Accordingly, it will be 
important to watch for barriers to access for 
newly insured children and their families. 
The first studies of the issue provide some 
reassurance that existing capacity in the 
health-care sector has been able to absorb 
the increased demand.82
Finally, the ACA contains a series of health-
care system delivery reforms designed to 
tackle two problems: the high cost and 
fragmentation of medical care. Specifically, 
the ACA introduces and supports a series 
of pilot demonstrations involving financing 
changes that accelerate the existing trend 
away from payments based on quantity of 
services toward a fixed, global per-patient 
payment, with payment bonuses for provid-
ing higher-quality care (for example, ensur-
ing that patients receive annual flu shots). 
Additionally, the ACA pilot demonstrations 
involve initiatives to enhance the coordina-
tion of care, which are expected to increase 
the continuity and integration of care across 
primary care providers and specialists. The 
two most notable reform models tested 
in these pilots are the Accountable Care 
Organization, a new type of multiprovider 
network that coordinates care across provid-
ers (primary care and specialty) and settings 
(hospital, outpatient, and in-home), and the 
Patient-Centered Medical Home (PCMH), 
a primary care-focused model providing 
enhanced payments to primary care provid-
ers to promote “whole patient” care. These 
pilots overwhelmingly focus on adult popu-
lations, so very few children are likely to 
benefit directly from them in the short run. 
But they indicate broader health-care system 
trends that are shaping changes in pediatric 
practice. Indeed, the concept of the medi-
cal home originated in pediatrics, and the 
American Academy of Pediatrics continues to 
advocate for pediatric-focused PCMHs.83 A 
key aim of such efforts is to integrate behav-
ioral health care into primary care, which is 
vital given the high prevalence of behavioral 
health problems among children.
Conclusions
The ACA builds on the earlier successes of 
Medicaid expansion and CHIP to promote 
children’s access to care, but challenges 
remain. We close by summarizing the three 
most significant challenges facing policy 
makers and policy-oriented researchers when 
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it comes to the relationship between chil-
dren’s access to care and their health.
Not All Children Have Coverage
The country has made tremendous progress 
in increasing insurance coverage among 
children, but some groups have been left 
behind. In particular, undocumented 
children have very few affordable coverage 
options. Immigrant children, including the 
undocumented, are less likely to have access 
to employer-sponsored insurance than are 
citizen children.84 Moreover, undocumented 
children are ineligible for both Medicaid/
CHIP and exchange coverage. Many of these 
children will continue to rely on free and/or 
greatly reduced-price care from safety net 
providers such as the FQHCs, free clinics, 
and public hospitals. Federal payments to 
safety net hospitals for uncompensated care 
are slated to decrease substantially under the 
ACA, further reducing the medical resources 
available to this vulnerable group. 
Coverage Does Not Guarantee Access
As we’ve noted, coverage is just one piece 
of the puzzle for ensuring access. Children 
may face barriers to access when they move 
between insurance plans (“churning”); 
they may also face barriers if there are not 
enough providers, or if not enough provid-
ers are willing to see children covered by 
Medicaid at the rate the government is 
willing to pay. Parents also play a critical 
role in ensuring that children get the care 
they need, when they need it. For example, 
adolescents, especially boys, are much less 
likely to have a usual care provider than are 
younger children, and they have relatively 
fewer medical visits (including preventive 
visits), even though adolescents have more 
health problems.85 Researchers hypothesize 
that a key reason for this gap is that par-
ents are less aware of adolescents’ health-
care needs compared to those of younger 
children.86
Other Inputs Are Critical
Our review of the evidence suggests that, 
without question, access to care plays an 
important role in promoting children’s 
health. Moreover, improving children’s 
access to care represents a relatively straight-
forward problem in the sense that, if the 
political will exists, we know which policies 
will work: expanding coverage, promot-
ing continuous coverage, and increasing 
reimbursement rates. At the same time, 
as we noted at the outset, access to care 
is not the whole reason that some kids are 
healthier than others. It is worth repeating 
a point from the RAND Health Insurance 
Experiment: even in the free care plan, 
30 percent of children had uncorrected 
vision problems in spite of receiving an 
average of more than three office visits per 
year.87 Nonmedical inputs into children’s 
health, such those discussed in the other 
articles in this issue, as well as the quality of 
the medical care that children can access, 
are also important pieces of the puzzle.
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